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1 Introduction 
 The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) does not explain how 
measurements take place. This gives rise to some thought-provoking demonstrations, usually called 
“paradoxes”, such as the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)[1], Schrödinger’s Cat[2] and Wigner’s 
friend experiments, which render questionable the theory’s claim to completeness, unless one 
assumes that consciousness plays a fundamental role in the implementation of the quantum 
measurement process.  
 Eugene P. Wigner (1902-1995), following the books published in 1932 and 1955 by the 
mathematician John von Neumann[3-4] (1903-1957) and a little book published in 1939 by the 
physicists Fritz London and Edmond Bauer[5], developed an argument in favour of the 
consciousness assumption, leading to the thesis of the wave-function (WF) collapse at biological-
mental level, here more simply called "idealistic interpretation of QM".1 
This paper proposes an unprecedented version of the Schrödinger’s cat and Wigner’s friend 
experiments with the sole purpose of disproving the consistency of the idealistic interpretation of 
QM. We use the term “idealistic” to refer to the Copenhagen [Niels Bohr (1905-1962)] view of 
atomic phenomena taken to the extreme. This view asserts that measurements occur, but without 
providing an explicit definition of the boundary which separates quantum from classical worlds. 
 This omission gives rise to the so called "measurement problem" with the theory, which 
weakens its claim to completeness.  
 Indeed, the Copenhagen interpretation is not the only possible interpretation of QM that is 
subject to this problem which, in more general terms, may be considered as that of defining a 
satisfactory transition process between micro-systems characterized by quantum state uncertainty 
and macro-systems obeying the deterministic laws of classical physics. From the 1930's onwards, 
the measurement problem has been at the centre of a scientific-philosophical debate with the 
purpose of establishing how (or whether) the collapse of the WF takes place [(see D. Bohm[6-7]; H. 
Everett[8]; E. Wigner[9-11]; J.A. Wheeler[12]; B.S. DeWitt[13]; W.H. Zurek[14]; G.C. Ghirardi, A. 
Rimini, T. Weber[15]; G.C. Ghirardi, R. Grassi, P. Pearle, [16]; R. Penrose[17--19]; S. Hameroff, 
R. Penrose[20]; H.P. Stapp[21]; M. Gell-Mann, J. Hartle[22]; C. Rovelli[23]; M. Tegmark[24]; S. 
Haroche[25]; J.S. Bell[26], and many other illustrious physicists (some of whom are shown in the list 
of References)]. The debate on this issue has given rise to endless discussions and, so far, there has 
been a lack of consensus regarding which interpretation might be correct. 
 Starting from the Copenhagen view, the idealistic interpretation assumes that the observer’s 
consciousness is the only factor which, playing an active role in the measurement process, is 
capable of determining the transition from the ambiguous realm of potentialities to our familiar and 
unequivocal realm of actual events. This is the kind of vision we mean when referring to the 
idealistic interpretation of QM. 
 The objective of the thought experiment that will be described hereafter is to demonstrate 
how such an interpretation, also known as "consciousness causes collapse hypothesis" (CCCH), is 
forced to conclusions incompatible with the assumption that consciousness is necessary for 
providing a complete explanation of the quantum measurement process. 
 
2 The DAP experiment  
 In this section we are going to propose a rather dramatic experiment, in which an audacious 
physicist named "P" is prepared to give her/his life to science. Imagine P inside a sealed room. In a 
                                                 
1There are two main theses arguing that consciousness and quantum mechanical measurement are connected to each other: one thesis 
(von Neumann, London and Bauer, Wigner, Stapp; see Refs 3-5, 9-11 and 22) holds that the observer's consciousness causes the 
collapse of the wave function, thus claiming to complete the quantum-to-classical transition, while the other thesis (Penrose; Penrose 
and Hameroff; see Refs 20 and 21) aims at demonstrating the opposite, i.e. that consciousness emerges from the so called 
"Orchestrated   Objective Reduction".     
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sense, P will play the role of Schrödinger’s cat as well as the part of Wigner’s friend2 in the original 
experiments, but – as will be seen – she/he will have a much more important role. 
On the ceiling of the room (figure 1) there is an apparatus, L,3 programmed to emit at a precise time 
a photon propagating in a direction along which is located a beam splitter, BS, which forms with it 
an angle of 45°. Beyond the BS there are two photo-detectors, D and D' with 100% efficiency; D is 
located along the path of the incident photon, fixed on top of a box and connected to a hammer 
inside it; under the hammer there is a glass flask containing a lethal dose of gas called "LGD"; D' is 
located along a path which is rotated by 90° with respect to the previous one. 
 The experiment is planned as follows: 
1. L will emit a photon at l2.00 AM hours; 
2. P has deliberately drugged her/himself one hour beforehand, at 11.00 AM, with a 
dose of a powerful narcotic, crucial for the experiment, called "CPB" (Conscious 
Perceptions Breaker) and 100% guaranteed to induce a heavy coma-like sleep for 
two hours; 
3. If D is activated, the hammer falls, shatters the flask, the LGD is released and 
subsequently P will die. 
4. If D' is activated,  P will be alive conscious at 1:00 PM. 
 Let us now briefly consider how quantum theory describes the experimental system: the 
photon WF collides with BS and splits into two component parts, one corresponding to the photon 
having been transmitted (T) and the other to the photon having been reflected (R), both with a 
probability amplitude given by a modulus of a coefficient, which, in our example, is 1/√2, as shown 
hereafter: 
                                                  |ψ> = (|photon T> + |photon R>)/√2                                              (1) 
 
 The combination of these two parts evolves as a linear superposition according to the 
Schrödinger equation and travels along two different paths, until the instant in which, in agreement 
with the wave-function collapse (or wave-packet reduction) postulate based on the Born rule,4 one 
presumes that a measurement process has occurred. This is the instant in which the WF collapses 
and one only of the possible alternatives becomes real, with probability given by the square of the 
associated modulus (hence, in our example, probability ½ for both alternatives). 
If one assumes, as Wigner, "the existence of an influence of the consciousness on the 
physical world" and that "the measurement is not completed until a well-defined result enters our 
consciousness" (see ref. 11, pp. 181, 187), that is until the WF collapses into either one or the other 
of its two component parts, then inside the room, as long as P is under the CPB effect, there is the 
linear superposition described above which, while time is passing, is propagating along the whole 
macroscopic measurement system up to the scale of P's brain. Subsequently, the superposition will 
cease to be linear when it reaches P's consciousness. 
                                                 
2Wigner's friend, here called “F”, is a physicist left alone inside a laboratory with the task of checking attentively whether or not a 
detector has emitted a flash (has registered the arrival of a photon or not). Wigner is waiting outside and suspects that F (as well as all 
other human beings) may  have weird perceptions and be in the superposition of macroscopically distinct states |F has perceived a 
flash> + |F has not perceived a flash>. Finally, Wigner enters the lab and asks F whether or not he  perceived a flash. His reply (yes 
or no) should remove any doubt as to whether the wave-function collapse has occurred. However, Wigner will question whether it is 
acceptable or not to establish that the collapse into one only of the two possible alternatives is determined by his action (his request 
and reception of an unambiguous answer). He poses this question since his initial way of interpreting the state of the system gives 
rise to a rather embarrassing paradox, from which he has three possible ways of escape: 1) accept a relative form of solipsism, in the 
sense that he believes to be, among all living creatures, the only one who has unambiguous perceptions, 2) assume that QM is an 
incomplete theory, 3) assume that QM is not applicable to human beings; he refutes solipsism and, being  a firm supporter  of QM 
completeness, opts for the last solution, assuming that there are beings, at least human beings, endowed with consciousness that 
constitutes an ultimate reality and plays an active role in determining the measurement process by rules that are not susceptible to 
scientific description. 
3In such a mechanism a battery is supplying electric power. 
4This rule, introduced by Max Born in 1926, states that in QM experiments the probability of obtaining any possible outcome, after a 
measurement/observation, is equal to the square of the corresponding probability amplitude. 
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 Consequently, there are two possibilities or chains of events, which we call "E(·)" and which 
will travel according to the superposition principle until a certain instant of the experiment: 
- ET: T (transmitted part of the wave function), D registers and triggers the hammer, the flask is 
shattered, LGD spreads in the room, P will be dead a few seconds after 12:00 PM. 
- ER: R (reflected part of the wave function), D' registers, the  hammer remains hooked, the flask 
intact, P will be alive conscious at1:00 PM.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Illustration of the experimental room during the time interval between 12:00 AM and 1:00 PM. 
 
 It will now be important to analyse the DAP experiment from the perspective of the CCCH. 
In particular, it is important to try to understand and establish when (at which exact point in time) it 
makes sense to say that the WF collapse has occurred. 
  
3 Formal description of the DAP experiment  
In discussing the DAP experiment described in section 2, we will now verify when or 
whether there are the conditions to bring about the collapse of the WF, ψ,  of the system. 
To this end, during the time interval between 12:00 AM and 1:00 PM, ψ can be formalised 
as follows: 
                   |ψ> = (|T, D registers>|P dead> + |R, D' registers>|P alive unconscious>)/√2               (2) 
 
 The above equation, which entails a superposition of macroscopically distinct states, is not 
in conflict with the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. The sign “+” between the two incompatible 
states is a very embarrassing element which does not allow us to assert that P is either  dead or 
alive. The CCCH establishes that the superposition can be eliminated only by making on the system 
an observation aimed at determining whether  P is dead or alive. 
  
3.1 Four remarks regarding the experiment 
 (i) - The expedient of the CPB has a fundamental function in this experiment; in fact, 
supposing that the CPB were not used, according to the idealistic interpretation of QM, P's 
consciousness would cause the collapse of the WF as soon as P has become aware of whether 
she/he were bound to die or to survive. 
 (ii) - Equation (2) describes quantum superposition of macroscopically distinct states in 
sequence, from detectors D and D’ to P’s brain.  
 (iii) - Again according to the idealistic interpretation, the collapse of the WF requires that 
one of its two branches be eliminated by an act of someone's conscious observation. 
 (iiii) - Human beings have access to their own internal states, perhaps similarly to cats or 
other animals, but, differently from these, they have the faculty of reasoning, drawing logical 
conclusions and making verbal reports, as it is for example in Wigner's experiment, where his 
friend is attentive and can provide an answer when  questioned about his experience; this last 
remark, even though not strictly relevant, will make sense in our description. 
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4 The DAP experiment disproves the CCCH consistency   
 We shall refer to Eq. (2) and  imagine an external person named "W" (a theoretical scientist 
supporter of the CCCH) who has in mind to open the sealed room at 1:30 PM. She is convinced that 
before looking inside it, i.e. during the time interval from 1:00 to 1:30 PM, all the measurement 
macro-apparatuses. P included, are in the entangled superposition of (2), as depicted in the figure 
below.  
 
Fig. 2 From W's point of view, here is depicted the (hypothetical) superposition of macroscopically distinct states of all measuring 
apparatuses during the time interval between 1:00 and 1:30 PM.. 
 
 W, wearing a gas mask as a precaution, decides to open the room to check whether P will be 
found either dead or alive: 
- 1st possible outcome : W finds P dead and she asserts that it has been her own act of conscious  
observation to cause the collapse of the WF. Note that, in this case, W performs voluntarily an  
observation on something that  is situated in the physical world outside her mind; here the situation 
is the same describable in Schrödinger’s cat experiment.   
- 2nd possible outcome: W finds P conscious and asks her/him what happened during the 
experiment. Promptly P, who personally planned the experiment,  answers that  she/he has certainly 
been conscious for about the past half hour, starting from 1:00 PM. In this case W, being an 
indomitable supporter of the CCCH, concludes that the appearance of P's consciousness5 at 1:00 
PM collapsed the wave function, eliminating the 'dead' state from the superposition. 
 However, P rejects W's conclusion as logically untenable owing to the considerations that 
we are going to delineate hereafter. 
 Since the CCCH implies by definition a causal connection between two phenomena, namely 
"the observer's consciousness" and "the WF collapse", we will examine whether, in the context of 
our experiment, there is a way to disprove the former as a causal agent of the latter. 
 Hence, in order to achieve our goal, we will adopt a line of reasoning putting forward four 
relevant points, followed by a final argumentation based on mere logic 
  First: we will focus our discussion on the second possible outcome (assuming that there is 
no more consciousness after death).        
 Second: when we refer to a conscious or self-conscious state, we find it appropriate to 
distinguish between intransitive (passive) and transitive (active) self-consciousness. 6   
 Third: when we consider any QM experiment, particularly Schrödinger's cat, Wigner's 
friend or similar versions, it is evident that the experimenter, in order to acquire knowledge of the 
actual outcome, has to perform an intentional observation/measurement that, according to the 
CCCH, collapses the wave function. In this case, the observer's consciousness is transitive and, 
more precisely, it plays an active role on the physical  world situated outside the mind. Still, it is 
clear that the above point does not fit the DAP experiment simply because P, in view of the 
introduction of the CPB strategy (never thought of before), plays a passive role. In fact P, as soon 
                                                 
5Given the self-referential property of consciousness, the terms "conscious" and “consciousness” will sometimes be replaced in the 
following by the terms "self-conscious" and “self-consciousness”. 
6See Pereira R. S., "Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness", Abstracta, Vol. 8, Nr 2, PP. 67-77 (2015). 
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as conscious at 1:00 PM, is neither in the same situation of the observer who deliberates to open the 
Schrödinger's box for verifying the state of the cat nor in the same status of attentiveness of 
Wigner's friend when checking whether he did perceive a flash or did not.  
 Fourth: we point out  that 1:00 PM is, by definition, the time in which P, as soon as the CPB 
effect is terminated, undergoes an immediate intuitive (non-intellectual) flash that lightens her/his 
whole being. That is to say that P appears intransitively in the state 'conscious'. In particular, at 1:00 
PM P's self-consciousness crops up as the "I" that is suddenly disclosed with itself before any 
objectification resulting from a subsequent transitive consciousness involved in cognitive activity. 
In such a disclosure of consciousness with itself, subject (the "I") and object ("itself") are 
indistinguishable and coexist as one and the same accidental entity. By this we mean that P appears 
involuntarily and immediately acquainted with her/himself as an alive conscious being. Thus, this 
very initial intuitive flash, occurring inside P's body at 1:00 PM, represents an intransitive 
consciousness, that constitutes the surprising (pre-reflexive) realization of her/his immediate 
existence, to which is expected to follow, at 1:00 + ɛ PM (with ɛ arbitrarily small), a transitive 
consciousness based on logical thinking, such as when P, remembering how the experiment was 
planned, becomes happily aware of having escaped death, or when she/he deduces that the flask 
containing the LGD  must be intact. 
 Final and crucial argumentation: if we again take into account W's claim that the collapse 
occurred at 1:00 PM, she will be led to conclude that the two events - the appearance of P's 
consciousness and the WF collapse (thought to be, respectively, the cause and the effect) - occurred 
simultaneously:7 between cause and effect no time has elapsed. But reflecting on this hasty 
conclusion, we can understand that W's conviction is founded on the wrong impression that at 1:00 
PM there are two distinct events occurring simultaneously, while at that time, indeed, only one event 
takes place: the fortuitous  actualization of the state ‘P alive-conscious’.     
This wrong impression, if not grasped as such, gives rise to irrational assertions. In fact, 
given that, at 1:00 PM, P enters the state 'alive-conscious', we find it illogical W's belief  that P's 
consciousness causes the collapse of the WF into the same state 'alive-conscious' that P is entering.  
According to our logic, causality is a relationship through which one event, A (the cause), 
gives rise to something else, B (the effect). Therefore, the idea (emerging from the above assertion) 
that the event A gives rise, as effect, to an event which is absolutely not different from A, has to be 
rejected as an absurdity.  
Finally, P is now certain that the appearance of her/his consciousness at 1:00 PM could not 
be the cause of the WF collapse. Instead, this is exactly the case in which its appearance must have 
been the effect resulting from the collapse occurred reasonably long before, when D' registered the 
arrival of the photon.    
 Summing up, given that the state ‘P alive unconscious’ in Eq. (2) changes into the state ‘P  
conscious’ at 1:00 PM, that's it! That is simply the outcome occurring inside P's body when the 
CPB effect is gone.   
  
5 Conclusions 
All the above considerations have led us to conclude that, in our experiment, the collapse of 
the WF cannot take place at 1:00 PM. This conclusion implies that the collapse is independent of 
the observer's consciousness and that the CCCH is logically inconsistent, despite a recurring 
conviction that it is not falsifiable; see for example J. Acacio de Barros and Gary Oas[28].  
  If our analysis is accepted as well-grounded, a supporter of the idealistic interpretation of 
QM, like W, could still believe that it has been her act of conscious observation to cause the 
                                                 
7
 The question of causality is problematic, since it requires a distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of this 
concept. Causality entails another (arguable) question called "cause and effect simultaneity", which has been discussed and 
investigated in depth by several philosophers, such as I. Kant, D. Hume, G.W. Leibniz and, recently, by Donald Gillies,  Jay F. 
Rosenberg, Sylvain Bromberger et al.; for a detailed understanding see Buzzoni M.:The Agency Theory of Causality, 
Anthropomorphism, and Simultaneity, section 6, published online: 29 Jan 2015, https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.979668. 
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collapse of the WF at 1:30 PM, no matter whether P were found dead or alive; but in this case she 
would be trapped in solipsism.8 
 Thus, starting from a rebuttal of solipsism as undesirable in science, one has to rely on an 
alternative interpretation of QM, in which the role of the conscious observer, who is required in all 
scientific experiences, is merely relegated to acknowledge the experimental results. We 
immediately  understand that these conclusions have further implications, such as:  
(a) - the concept of "collapse of the WF independently of consciousness" emerge from the logical 
structure of our thought experiment based on the CPB strategy, since it allows to see in a new light 
the relationship between subject and object of observation (as explained in section 4); 
(b) - if it were not conceivable an experiment such as the DAP, capable of disproving the CCCH, 
this latter would still represent a possible and, for a few physicists, even more suitable alternative to 
the wide range of different interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
(c) - in the realistic QM theories based on the collapse postulate, the boundary between quantum 
and classical systems should now be reasonably rescaled down to the transition point between the 
quantum system  described in (1)] and the initial (uncertain number of) atomic components of the 
photo-detector with which it interacts at 12:00 + ∆t2 PM (where ∆t2 is the travelling time of the 
photon WF from the source L to D and D'); 
(d) -  in the collapse theories Schrödinger’s cat experiment can no longer be considered a paradox: 
before opening the box, the cat (as well as P in the DAP experiment) is in a statistical mixture of 
states, 'dead' or 'alive'; 
(e) - the falsification of the CCCH rules out also the hypothesis that the collapse of all the wave-
functions involved in our Universe (according to the hypothesis shared by many scientists that 
consciousness is regarded as an emergent phenomenon) occurred when the first conscious human 
being appeared in it, thus avoiding to render the big-bang a senseless theory; 
(f) - One might also argue that the DAP experiment makes the Everett's Many-Worlds 
Interpretation (or Many-Minds Interpretation) rather problematic [15]. According to this view of QM, 
no collapse takes place and each of all possible outcomes described by the wave function is 
physically actualized in some universe. We leave to the readers the task to evaluate the possible 
implications of this issue, since in one of the two branches of the WF P is in the state 'dead'. 
 (g) - the CPB strategy adopted in our experiment can also be applied to cases in which 
consciousness is present in both branches of the wave function, as described in Wigner's friend 
experiment. We leave the analysis of this specific issue to further research.  
 In synthesis, the starting point of our work is that the idealistic interpretation requires the 
superposition of macroscopically distinct states as well as  the conscious  perceptive faculty of the 
observer. This is necessary for consciousness to play a fundamental role in the collapse of the WF. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to devise at least a thought experiment (e.g. our DAP), which disproves 
the hypothesis that it is the observer's consciousness that causes the collapse. If this is shared as 
logically compelling, then one is left with the immediate issue of what the best alternative to the 
idealistic interpretation should be, and clearly this is an entirely different (and daunting) problem.  
 However, we feel that the ordinary idea behind our experiment is that there are two 
ingredients, given by the wave function and the conscious state of potential observers, which cannot 
in general be clearly separated, at least in such a way as to make the latter a causal agent in the 
collapse of the former. If this is true, then a fruitful way to tackle the measurement problem can 
only be one that treats the above two ingredients in a single coherent framework.  
 Recent advances in the quantum de-coherence and a re-examination of Everett's Many 
Worlds Interpretation suggest that such a framework could be constructed entirely within the 
boundaries of the theory itself; see, for instance, Roland Omnès[29], Maximilian Schlosshauer[30] and 
                                                 
8There are two different forms of solipsism: one is described  in note 2 as a relative solipsism, the other (associated to an inflexible 
belief in the CCCH) would lead to an absolute solipsism, that is to say  "I believe to be the only thinking entity, while an external 
reality (including my body), being a product of my mind, does not exist. 
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David Wallace[31], but clearly this is not the only route; see also Bernard d'Espagnat[32] and the very 
recent works of Art Hobson[33-34]. 
 Furthermore, the DAP experiment could represent a good reason for strengthening some of 
the actual quantum mechanical spontaneous localization models, where observers have no particular 
role: we are referring to Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber theory (GRW), to Penrose and to Hameroff- 
Penrose interpretations, in which the WF is assumed to be as a physical reality and its collapse as an 
objective dynamical process, that in Penrose's approach is supposed to be induced by gravity.  
 We would like to close this paper quoting the following words of Steven Weinberg[35, p. 124]: 
"I read a good deal of what had been written by physicists who had worried deeply about the 
foundations of quantum mechanics, but I felt some uneasiness at not being able to settle on any of 
their interpretations of quantum mechanics that seemed to me entirely satisfactory". 
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